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Zusammenfassung
Im März 2000 hat der Europäische Rat von Lissabon mit der ‚offenen Methode der Koordinie-
rung‘ (OMK) ein neues Politikinstrument eingeführt mit dem Ziel, sozialpolitisch sensible Berei-
che wie soziale Integration, Alterssicherung, Gesundheit und Langzeitpflege zu gestalten.
Dieses Papier gibt einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Entwicklungen und Anforderungen, die
sich für den Prozess der OMK insbesondere im Bereich der Alterssicherung stellen. Das Papier ist
deskriptiv und konzentriert sich in erster Linie auf den Prozess und dessen Instrumente, die invol-
vierten Akteure sowie deren unterschiedliche Ziele und Ansätze. Abschließend nimmt das Papier
Bezug zum Erweiterungsprozess der Europäischen Union. In diesem Zusammenhang wird ver-
deutlicht, dass hinsichtlich der Frage, wie die 10 Beitrittsländer in die OMK mit einzubeziehen
sind, bislang nur wenig Fortschritte erzielt wurden. Dennoch könnte – insb. im Zuge des Erweite-
rungsprozesses – die OMK zukünftig die nationalen Rentenreformprozesse (indirekt) beeinflus-
sen.
Summary
In March 2000 the European Council of Lisbon introduced the ‘open method of co-ordination’
(OMC) as a new policy instrument to tackle politically sensitive areas, namely social inclusion,
old-age security, health, and long-term care.
This paper gives a view over the most important developments and main issues raised by the
OMC process, particularly in the area of old-age security. The paper is descriptive and focuses on
the processes and their tools, the involved actors and their different broad objectives as well as
approaches. Finally, the paper deals with the enlargement process of the European Union. In the
same context it is discussed that not much thought has been given to the question of how exactly
the 10 candidate countries can be integrated comprehensively into the OMC. Nevertheless, it is
possible that – especially due to the enlargement process – the OMK has an indirect effect on fu-
ture national old-age security reforms.
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5Introduction
During the previous decade political interest focused mainly on the European Monetary Union
(EMU). Now, at the dawn of the new millennium and the upcoming enlargement
1
 the European
Union (EU) had to define new aims. In March 2000 the European Council of Lisbon started a new
initiation by setting a strategic aim for the Union as a whole: to render Europe the most competi-
tive, economically, and socially cohesive area in a global context.
2
 Decisions had to be made in
order to meet this ambitious goal and to strengthen the social dimension of Europe. Therefore, the
Lisbon Summit established the ‘open method of co-ordination’ (OMC) for national social policies
among member states as a means of pursuing economic and employment growth coupled with
greater social cohesion.
3
 The main modification between previous EU policy instruments and the
OMC is its so-called soft policy approach. Thus, the OMC represents a new type of policy making
and regulation on the EU level: on the one hand, it is softer than the classical legislative approach,
but on the other hand it implies more than a simple non-binding recommendation or a political
declaration. However, in view of the EU enlargement it is to be noticed, that so far the candidate
countries are not involved in the OMC process at all. Nevertheless, candidate countries could be-
come relevant actors for the development and relevancy of the OMC especially in the area of old-
age security. In some of these transformation economies radical old-age security reforms were
implemented in the last decade. By the aid of the OMC these reforms could be evaluated and the
experiences be made transparent. If the OMC resumes that the old-age security models of the can-
didate countries happen to be the best-practice, this circumstance would (indirectly) influence
future reform processes of current EU member states.
The OMC will be implemented in the area of social inclusion, old-age security, health and long-
term care after having been used in the employment area since the late 90’s. This paper describes
the most important developments and main issues raised by the OMC particularly in the area of
old-age security of EU member states as well as of candidate countries. Starting with a brief in-
troduction about European integration and social policy (1.), the paper illustrates three main
points: First, the channels at the European level that are influencing decisions for national old-age
security systems (2.). Second, the process of the OMC as a whole regarding old-age security (3.).
In this part the paper presents the main actors involved (3.1); followed by an overview of their
different approaches (3.2); this part concludes with an examination of the current debate about
social indicators and benchmarks, which is the point at issue right now (3.3). Third, the paper
describes the crucial role of the candidate countries in the OMC process. (4.). Finally, the paper
ends with some concluding remarks (5.).
                                                  
1
 The candidate countries for the upcoming enlargement in 2004 are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
2 
Cf. European Council (2000: 1).
3
 Cf. European Council (2000: 2).
61. European integration and social policy
From its very beginning the European Economic Community (EEC) has been confronted with the
problem of social protection.
4
 During the preparatory stages prior to signing the Treaty of Rome in
1956/57, the question was raised as to whether or not harmonisation of social protection systems
is necessary.
5
 One side, at that time especially the French government and trade unions, claimed
that, once the barriers fall, free competition of social security systems might lead to market disad-
vantages for countries with a high level of social security and, therefore, with higher contributions
in comparison with their competitors with a lower level of social security, and consequently lower
contributions as well. Furthermore, these disparities should not lead to market distortions. There-
fore, they supported a progressive harmonisation of social security systems (and especially their
funding), while at the same time custom barriers should be removed.
6
 The opposing side, particu-
larly the German government and employers' associations, stated that the Common Market could
accommodate existing differences. The argument was that social charges are an element of labour
cost, but only one factor among others affecting the competitiveness.
7
 The overall result was that
problems raised of harmonisation of social security systems within the Community are extremely
complex.
8
 Therefore, during the European integration harmonisation of social security remained a
big issue but has never been put into practice.
9
Today the systems of social security – and especially these of old-age security – within EU mem-
ber states and in candidate countries still differ not only in organisation but also in their concep-
tion.
10
 Nevertheless, in view of the European Commission, on closer examination this diversity
                                                  
4
 The European Economic Community (EEC) was renamed into European Community (EC) in 1993 with
the Treaty of Maastricht. Since then the latter is the ‘first pillar’ of the European Union (EU). The term so-
cial protection is widely similar to the term social security. The former is usually used in a Community
context, whereas the latter is used in a national context, particularly in the German one.
5
 This issue was raised already in June 1955 at the conference of the foreign ministries in Messina. For the
final communiqué see Außenminister (1955: 7974) as well as the comments in Kuhn (1995: 34 ff.) and
Göbel (2002: 3 ff.).
6
 For extensive comments see Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, et al. (1962) as well as Hankel / Zweig
(1957: 548 ff.); Heise (1963) and Heise (1964).
7
 See again the comments in Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, et al. (1962) as well as Knolle (1963)
and Erdmann (1963).
8
 Cf. Hug (1962); Lell (1966); Heise (1966); Mayer (1989) and Schmähl (1990: 32 ff.). For the economic
consequences of harmonisation see Schmähl (1993: 325 ff.).
9
 For a historic view over the development stages of European social policy, see Henningsen (1992); Berié
(1993); Kuhn (1995) and Kowalsky (1999).
10
 The main catchwords that describe the consisting differences are Bismarck and Beveridge. In the Bismarck
social security systems the financing is borne by both employees and employers. Benefits are salary-linked,
for the aim was to guarantee that all workers could maintain their living standard if particular risks would
appear. The Bismarck system is a form of solidarity between the workers. The Beveridge concept stated
that not only the workers, but also the total population was entitled to subsistence security. Regardless of
the type of employment, it provides – by means of taxes – the same lump sum benefit for every citizen, in
case of unemployment, sickness and old-age security. Still the various social security systems existing
7proves to be less significant than it seems. Therefore, in the early 90’s the Community proposed
the promotion of convergence of member states’ social policies, while recognising and respecting
the diversity and autonomy of systems.
11
 The result of the convergence approach were two Coun-
cil recommendations in 1992.
12
 Both recommendations were based on the principles of subsidiar-
ity as implemented later in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.
13
 However, there is still no explicit
and comprehensive policy regarding national social security on the European level.
14
 Neverthe-
less, there are different channels by which decisions at the EU level may influence (indirectly as
well as directly) especially old-age security systems.
2. Channels influencing national old-age security at the EU level
As indicated in the previous part, the old-age security systems within EU member states and in the
candidate countries still differ not only in organisation but also in their conception: different nor-
mative ideas (Bismarck vs. Beveridge) as well as aims (maintenance of living standard vs. poverty
avoidance) resulted in conceptually different national old-age security systems that developed
over time. They have in common that they are based upon three different pillars respectively tiers.
In general, these pillars are the public old-age security system (in Germany especially the social
(statutory) pension insurance and the schemes for civil servants), and supplementary systems (in
Germany supplementary occupational schemes in the private and public sector), as well as the
additional private old-age provision (for instance due to private life insurance). Moreover, impor-
tant distinction can be made with regard to financing (pay-as-you-go vs. capital funded; contribu-
tions vs. taxes), the organisation (public vs. private), the insured persons (citizens or inhabitants
vs. specific groups, e.g. self-employed persons), and the benefits of the systems. These structural
features can relate to the three pillars and differ from member state to member state. The relevant
characteristic of the formal old-age security system is the quantitative importance of the three
different pillars.
15
 At present – according to the current Community law – each EU member state
is responsible for the conception of its formal old-age security system.
16
 Nevertheless, figure 1
                                                                                                                                                              
within the EU are often (partly or completely) based upon these systems. A closer view on the structural
features especially of the old-age security systems will be added in the following part (2.).
11
 Cf. Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1989: 28 f.) as well as Kommission der Europäischen
Gemeinschaften (1991: 3).
12
 The Council Recommendation (92/442/EEC) is on Convergence of social protection objectives and poli-
cies whereas the Council Recommendation (92/441/EEC) is on Common criteria concerning sufficient re-
sources and social assistance in the social protection systems. For comments on these aspects see Schulte
(1991); Hauser (1995) as well as Göbel (2002).
13
 The convergence approach was supposed to be essentially flexible and multiform and is marked by similar
basics in comparison with the OMC. Cf. Göbel (2002: 131).
14
 Cf. Schulte (2001).
15
 Cf. Schmähl (2001: 182 ff.) as well as Schmähl (2002).
16
 Cf. Schulte (2001).
8shows important channels by which the design, the scope and the structure of national old-age
security systems can be influenced.
Figure 1: Channels of possible influences on national old-age security systems at EU level
implementation of the 4 basic freedoms
competition & antitrust rules
Maastricht
convergence criteria
convergence of prob-
lems & objectives
regulations
directives
recommendations
ECJ ruling SGP (incl. BEPG) Open method of co-
ordination (OMC)
! ! ! !
national old-age security system
structure: pay-as-you-go vs. capital funded
contributions vs. taxes
compulsory vs. optional
public vs. private
1st, 2nd, 3rd pillars (quantitative importance)
Source: Author on basis of Schmähl (2002: 102).
The figure above illustrates the activities to implement the four basic freedoms, namely free
movement of goods, free movement of workers, freedom to provide services, and free movement
of capital.
17
 Since 1957 these freedoms and instruments to ensure them – namely regulations, di-
rectives and recommendations – have been fixed in the Treaty of Rome.
18
 During the last years the
competition and antitrust rules, which are implemented in the Treaty as well, got an ever growing
influence on the national social security systems.
19
 In this context further important factors are the
rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), known as one of the driving forces of integra-
tion.
20
 At last the indirect as well as direct impacts of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
should not be neglected. The implementation of the Maastricht convergence criteria on public
                                                  
17
 For the EU activities to implement the four basic freedoms and its effects on the national social policies see
Schmähl (1997: 22 ff.) as well as the other comments in Schmähl / Rische (1997).
18 
Cf. Schulte (2001) with references. As an example, there are to name the Council Regulation
(71/1408/EEC) on the Application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families mov-
ing within the Community as well as the Council Regulation (72/574/EEC) fixing the procedure for imple-
menting (71/1408/EEC). These co-ordination rules are to help avoid disadvantages in cross-border activi-
ties. Cf. Ruland (1991); Polster (1994) and Andel (2001). Another example for indirect effects on pension
policies may result from the directive of equal treatment of men and women – e.g. the Council Directive
(79/7/EEC) on the Progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in
matters of social security as well as the Council Directive (86/378/EEC) on the Implementation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes, which is now
amended by the Council Directive (96/97/EC). These directives have remarkable effects in old-age security
schemes regarding retirement ages. For this aspect see Schmähl (1993: 8) and Sieveking (1997: 206 f.).
19
 For the influence of the competition and antitrust rules on the national security systems see
Haverkate / Huster (1999: 285 ff.) and Eichenhofer (2001: 187 ff.).
20
 Cf. Schmähl (1993: 7 ff.); Eichenhofer (1996); Sieveking (1997) and Leibfried / Pierson (1998: 60 ff.) as
well as Leibfried / Pierson (1999).
9budgets is essential for the national level of social security.
21
 These criteria and the multilateral
surveillance procedure in association with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) as its main instrument can be used as an important political
lever for the design, scope and structure of national old-age security systems.
22
 These remarks
prove that measures to implement the four basic freedoms and the Maastricht criteria may affect,
indirectly as well as directly, national old-age security systems.
23
In addition to that, the Commission pointed out that the systems of social security themselves and
especially those of old-age security are facing various structural changes and common problems.
To name but a few: the increasing activity rate of women, the ageing of the European population
due to demographic reasons, a high level of long-term unemployment, changes in the living ar-
rangements and structure of households, as well as the high level of taxes and social contributions.
Furthermore, the Commission points out that due to the establishment of the single European
market and the EMU the growing mobility of people entail the need of unified rules of social se-
curity.
24
As pointed out in the historical review, harmonisation of social security has always been one ob-
vious goal in the past. Since then it has been replaced by convergence of social security systems,
which means first of all convergence of objectives.
25
 Now, the open method of co-ordination is the
supposed policy instrument to promote the process of convergence, starting with the areas of so-
cial inclusion, old-age security, health and long-term care after having been used in the employ-
ment field since the late 90’s.
26
                                                  
21 
For the Italian social security system the direct and indirect effects of the EMU were immense. For this
case see Gohr (2001); for the German one see Schulz-Weidner (1995); Rürup (2000) and Ruland (2000).
More general are the comments in Schmähl / Rische (1997).
22
 The multilateral surveillance procedure as a whole is implemented in article 99 EC Treaty whereas the
sanction mechanisms of the SGP are implemented in the Council Regulation (97/1467/EC) on Speeding up
and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. These sanction mechanisms include
binding recommendations and fines, if an EMU member state has a public deficit of more than 3 per cent
of its gross domestic product (GDP).
23
 For these aspect see Schmähl (2002: 103).
24
 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (1999). For earlier documents see Kommission der Eu-
ropäischen Gemeinschaften (1993); Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1994) as well as
Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1995) and Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften
(1997).
25
 For the major differences between the approaches of harmonisation and convergence see Lochner (1962)
as well as Schulte (1990); Schmähl (1993: 11); Schmähl (1993: 314 ff.); Göbel (2002: 12 ff.) and Schulte
(2002: 7 f.).
26 
For the experience and success of the European Employment Strategy (EES) see Blanpain (1998) and
Jacobsson / Schmid (2002). For the influence of the EES on the German employment policy see
Ostheim / Zohlnhöfer (2002).
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3. The Open method of co-ordination (OMC) regarding old-age security
During the Lisbon Summit in March 2000 the EU decided on the strategic aim to become “the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”
27
. The ‘open method of
co-ordination’ (OMC) was established as one tool to reach this ambitious goal. The conclusions of
the Lisbon Council stipulate that the OMC is a decentralised but carefully co-ordinated process as
a means of spreading best-practice and achieving greater convergence towards EU goals. The
OMC is supposed to help member states to develop their own national social policies.
28
 The whole
process involves the following four elements:
• “fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals
which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors
as a means of comparing best-practice;
• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific
targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences;
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes”
29
.
A key component of the OMC is its decentralised approach in which various actors, especially the
European Commission and the member states, have an active function with regard to the principle
of subsidiarity as implemented in article 5 EC-Treaty of Amsterdam. The conception of the OMC
implies a high importance for a supranational exchange of information, experiences and views.
The OMC is supposed to reach a higher level of transparency concerning necessary reform meas-
ures through an intensified political co-operation between member states in the Council of the EU.
By this means the OMC is supposed to be conducive to the convergence of the different old-age
security systems. In view of the European Council, a necessity for the usage of this method in
social policy respectively old-age security policy is rooted in the common problems and develop-
ments – especially the ageing of the European population due to demographic reasons – within the
EU member states that (could) constitute a potential disadvantage with regard to the increasing
intensification of global competition.
30
 Moreover, the (official) aim of the OMC does explicitly
not consist in the legal and/or formal harmonisation of European old-age security systems by the
                                                  
27
 European Council (2000: 2).
28 
Cf. Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. (2001: 9 ff.).
29
 European Council (2000: 12).
30
 Cf. European Council (2001: 1).
11
EU in order to maintain the possibility for different national conceptions of organising old-age
security systems to exist.
31
In contrast to the conventional legal tools of the EU (e.g. regulations and directives) the OMC
represents an instrument without legal binding (i.e. soft-law). Altogether, the OMC remains not
binding with regard to aspects of legal competence, decision relevance and finance. The OMC is
not supposed to establish legal sanctions on irregular policy. It rather aims at a process of bench-
marking, the determination of best-practice, and to promote a continuous process of learning-by-
seeing. Concerning this aspect it has to be noticed that several scientists and administration offi-
cials point out, that the OMC in the social policy area is not only influenced by the employment
area, but by the co-ordination rules of the EMU as well.
32
 It has to be mentioned in this context
that the OMC regarding social policy is based on a soft approach – and this differs from the hard
EMU approach. The latter is based upon the Treaty of Amsterdam and the SGP, which includes
sanction mechanisms. In the social policy area there is nothing alike yet.
Nevertheless, should the OMC be continuously developed accordingly, and in case the OMC
turns out to be an instrument to put into practice the formulated European broad common objec-
tives
33
, this (non-binding) process could cause peer-pressure even without sanction mechanisms.
34
This peer-pressure could become the more intensive the bigger the differences between an exist-
ing old-age security system of a particular member state, and the conceptions formulated within
the OMC framework respectively the best-practice. In view of that, to sum up, the OMC repre-
sents a new type of policy making and regulation: on the one hand, it is softer than the classical
legislative approach, but on the other hand it implies more than simple non-binding recommenda-
tions or political declarations even without sanction mechanisms.
35
  Keeping these facts in mind,
let us have a closer look on the role of European institutions and policy committees related to old-
age security.
                                                  
31
 In detail, the Commission of the European Communities (2000: 13) pointed out that “member States [have]
to decide what pension system they want and what policy mix is required to maintain adequate incomes for
older people without jeopardising the stability of public finances, undermining employment incentives or
squeezing out other essential public expenditures.” For these aspects see Council of the European Union
(2001: 2) as well.
32
 For this aspect see the extensive comments in Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (2002) and
Devetzi / Schmitt (2002: 236) as well as Hodson / Maher (2001: 720 ff.). It is mentioned that this process is
inspired by the experiences of the Luxembourg-Process and the ESS, which has been institutionalised by
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the process of OMC as a
whole is not embodied in the Treaty of Amsterdam yet. Furthermore, there is no explicit reference to it in
the articles of the Treaty of Nice. On the other hand, Hauser (2002: 252) and Schulte (2002: 19) as well
stated that the new article 137 of the Treaty of Nice describes a method that – according to their interpreta-
tion – shows similarities to the OMC.
33
 The formulated European broad common objectives will be described in part 3.2.
34
 Cf. Streeck (1996: 77 ff.), who called this kind of governance ‘neo-voluntarism’. Especially governance by
persuasion, e.g. due to recommendation, expertise, explication and consultation, shows similarities to the
OMC.
35
 For comments on these issues see Scharpf (2000: 22 ff.) as well as Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissen-
schaft und -gestaltung e.V. (2001: 11 f.) and Schulte (2002: 23 f.).
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3.1 The role of European Institutions and Policy Committees
Looking at the main OMC actors it has to be distinguished between the level of decision-making
and the Committee level. The main actors at the decision-making level are the European Council,
the Council of the EU, and the European Commission.
36
The European Council brings together the Heads of States and Governments of the fifteen mem-
ber states of the European Union and the President of the European Commission. During its
spring meetings the European Council passes general political guidelines and observes recent
developments so far.
37
 The Council is the central decision-making body, consisting of member
states governments, respectively ministers, whose representatives regularly meet at the lower
ministerial level. The Council is the legislative authority of the EU. Regarding the OMC, the
Council for Economics and Finances (Ecofin) and for Employment and Social Policy (ESP) are
the main players.
38
 The European Commission embodies the general interests of the EU and acts
as a driving force in the integration process. It proposes directions to take, and implements the
measures decided upon by Council and Parliament as well. Regarding the OMC, the Commission
on her part is responsible for co-ordination and for development of an evaluation method. The
Commission plays a catalysing role in several respects, notably by presenting proposals concern-
ing the European guidelines as well as the social indicators and benchmarks, organising the ex-
change of best-practice, and providing support to the follow-up and examination by the peers.
39
 In
addition, the European Commission has the capacity to build up knowledge through its involve-
ment in all stages of the process.
40
On the committee level there are two main actors:
41
 the Economic Policy Committee (EPC)
42
 pre-
pares the work that supports the discourse of the Ecofin Council, whereas the Social Protection
                                                  
36
 The other decision-making actors of the EU – the European Parliament (EP), the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) – are completely absent from the OMC process. Cf.
the figure concerning the role of European institutions and policy committees related to old-age security
systems in Council of the European Union (2001: 10).
37
 Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 10).
38
 The Ecofin Council is the crucial actor within the OMC process, because of its leading role in the EMU.
The ESP Council is not as influential as the Ecofin Council, since it is not equipped with comparable
mechanisms yet.
39
 Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 8).
40
 Cf. Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. (2001: 9). The documents published
by the Commission originate from different Directorates General (DG), namely the DG for Economic and
Financial Affairs (DG Ecfin) and the DG for Employment and Social Affairs (DG ESA). This implies the
co-existence of different positions within the European Commission as a whole. For these aspects see
Porte / Pochet (2002).
41
 Moreover, there are two more Committees regarding old-age security, namely the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC) and the Employment Committee (EMCO), but these committees are not as crucial as the
other actors. Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 10).
42
 Regarding the OMC the EPC assists the Ecofin Council and the DG Ecfin in the assessment of national
old-age security policy, focusing on the economic and budgetary implications of financing old-age secu-
rity. Moreover, the EPC assists the Ecofin Council in drafting the joint Council/Commission report on pen-
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Committee (SPC)
43
 prepares the work that supports the discourse of the ESP Council. Both Com-
mittees are supposed to work jointly on implementing the OMC with regard to old-age security.
44
In the following parts the different approaches of the actors in the emergence of old-age security
on the European agenda will be described, before having a closer look on the current debate on
social indicators and benchmarks as the main instruments of the OMC.
3.2 The relevant actors and their different approaches
The OMC process regarding old-age security started in June 1999 with a Commission communi-
cation on a Concerted Strategy for Social Protection. The four objectives, of which one deals with
old-age security, would be associated with the exchange of information and the monitoring of
policy developments by annual reports drawn by member states and the Commission.
45
 During the
first half of 2000 the Portuguese Presidency claimed a crucial importance of active employment
policies, and declared that bolstering the sustainability of social security systems depends to a
large extent on the increase of the employment rate within the European Union.
46
 Moreover, the
European Council of Lisbon defined the OMC in order to tackle problems within politically sen-
sitive areas.
47
As indicated above, the European Council agrees upon the general political guidelines in the pro-
cess of the OMC. For example the Stockholm Council confirmed in March 2001 that “the ageing
society calls for clear strategies for ensuring the adequacy of old-age security systems as well as
of health care systems and care of the elderly, while at the same time maintaining sustainability of
public finances and inter-generational solidarity. Where appropriate, the potential of the open
method of coordination should be used to the full, particularly in the field of old-age security,
                                                                                                                                                              
sion reforms. The EPC develops indicators, especially for long-term financial sustainability of old-age se-
curity systems and prepares simulations to be carried out by member states. In its work the EPC is sup-
ported by the ‘Working Group on Ageing populations’. Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 10).
43
 Regarding the OMC the SPC assists the ESP Council and the DG ESA in the assessment of national old-
age security strategies, focusing particularly on the adequacy of pensions and adaptation to a changing so-
ciety as a part of the OMC. Similar to the EPC, the SPC assists its ESP Council in drafting the joint Coun-
cil/Commission report on reforms regarding old-age security systems. The SPC develops indicators, espe-
cially for the adequacy and adaptability of old-age security systems. The ‘Indicators Working Group’ sup-
ports the SPC in its work. Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 10).
44
 Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 10).
45
 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (1999).
46
 On the Lisbon Council the objective was proposed of increasing the employment rate of the Union to 70
per cent by 2010 – and to 60 per cent for woman. Cf. European Council (2000: 10).
47
 A specific mandate was defined for reforms in the area of old-age security. This mandate includes a fore-
cast study on the sustainability of old-age security was to be prepared by the SPC, taking into account the
ongoing work of the EPC in this area. Cf. European Council (2000: 11). The EPC had begun to undertake
an in-depth analysis of the sustainability of national old-age security systems since 1997, see Economic
Policy Committee (1997).
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taking due account of the principle of subsidiarity”
48
. Since then, the strong inter-dependency
between the financial sustainability of public finances and essential reforms concerning the old-
age security systems is officially accepted and widely established among the European popula-
tion.
49
The Council is the central decision-making body of the EU. But, regarding the debate on old-age
security systems two different approaches become obvious, an economic one and a social one.
50
The Ecofin Council and its advisory groups, on the one hand, promote an economically orientated
approach. That focuses on the financial sustainability of the old-age security systems within the
Community. As mentioned above, the EMU and especially the SGP with its new constraints have
re-enforced the discussion on the reduction of size of the pay-as-you-go financed pillar of old-age
security systems in order to curb the public dept and to reach a balanced budget. In view of that,
the discussion on financing old-age security has moved into the centre. These developments show
the report on Budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations: the impact on public spending
on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly and possible indicators of the long-term
sustainability of public finances. This report, which was prepared by an Ecofin advisory group,
concludes (again) that ageing will result in further increases of old age dependency ratios (even if
the Lisbon targets on employment are met) and in public spending on old-age security in most
member states. The report suggests that further cuts in spending on public old-age security sys-
tems may be needed,
51  
but this implied that elderly persons wishing to attain a certain standard of
living would have to continue to work after the current retirement age, and/or to invest in private
pension plans throughout their active years. Moreover, the most controversial issue concerning the
indicators, namely the central old-age security indicator proposed in this report, was on budgetary
projections of future expenditures on old-age security.
52
The ESP Council and its advisory groups on the other hand promote a socially orientated ap-
proach. That focuses on maintaining people’s trust in their national old-age security systems. In its
report Sustainability of Pensions these actors trace out three main tasks for national governments
regarding their old-age security systems.
53
 The first is to ensure that old-age security systems meet
their social functions of providing safe and adequate pensions.
54
 The second is to generate long-
term financial sustainability of old-age security systems, in order to ensure intergenerational fair-
                                                  
48 
European Council (2001: 8).
49
 Awareness of these problem has been growing among citizens, as is shown by the results of a Euro-
barometer survey (56.1) conducted by the Commission in autumn of 2001. A more comprehensive analysis
of the results is forthcoming. For first results see Commission of the European Communities (2002: 14 ff.).
50
 For these aspects see Schulte (2002: 26 ff.) and Porte / Pochet (2002) as well.
51
 Cf. Economic Policy Committee (2001: 30 f.).
52
 This issue will be discussed in part 3.3.
53
 The report is based on fifteen national studies of EU member states on the challenges for their national old-
age security system.
54
These actors highlighted earlier the importance of evaluating the social and financial sustainability of old-
age security systems: “It will not be possible to separate financial sustainability; one cannot be guaranteed
without the other” Council of the European Union (2000: 12).
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ness. The final task is to enhance the flexibility of old-age security systems in order to respond to
the changing economic environment.
55
In addition to these two different approaches, there is the one of the European Commission that
combines social and economic objectives. The Commission issued first a communication on the
Future Evolution of Social Protection from a Long-Term Point of View: Safe and Sustainable
Pensions. According to this paper the success of old-age security reforms is closely connected to a
forceful economic policy as well as active employment policy. Based on this policy line, the
communication laid down ten principles for pension reforms.
56
 The following communication on
Supporting National Strategies for Safe and Sustainable Pensions through an Integrated Ap-
proach seems to be a compromise between different actors within the Commission but leans more
towards an economic approach.
57
Considering these different positions it can be concluded that discord between the involved actors
hinders the creation of a clear European vision in this area. The result may be a mix of different
approaches. Such an approach based on compromises can be seen in the joint report on Objectives
and working methods in the area of pensions: applying the open method of co-ordination. This
report is one of the core documents concerning the OMC in the area of old-age security.
58
 But it
took substantial disputes, before the main actors agreed upon objectives and working methods. An
agreement on common social indicators, as instructed by the Gothenburg Council in June 2001,
though was not possible. Nevertheless, the report underlines that the EU level should combine
existing policy processes with the OMC in order to integrate national actors respective to their
sphere of competence and power into the process.
59
 The joint proposal is based on eleven common
objectives. The three broad socio-economic goals are the following:
60
• First, pension levels should meet social objectives. That is, preventing poverty in old-age and
ensure participation of elderly people in public, social and cultural life, at the same time gen-
erating inter- and intragenerational fairness.
• Second, old-age security systems should be financially sustainable via higher levels of em-
ployment. Participation of older workers should be promoted and a fair balance between ac-
tive and retired workers. Private and public pension schemes should be efficient, affordable,
portable, and offer security.
                                                  
55
 Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 3 f.).
56
 For these principles and objectives see Commission of the European Communities (2000: 13 f.).
57
 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2001: 4 ff.).
58
 This report was to prepare for the Barcelona Council in March 2002. It was approved by the Employment
and Social Policy (ESP) Council of December 3rd 2001 and confirmed by the Laeken Council in December
2001.
59
 These existing policy processes are the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), the multilateral sur-
veillance process as implemented in article 99 EC Treaty (including the Cardiff process), the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), the European Employment Strategy (EES) and finally the Social Inclusion Process. Cf.
Council of the European Union (2001: 3 f.).
60
 Cf. Council of the European Union (2001: 6 ff.).
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• Third, pensions should be adapted to changing economic, social and individual needs through
generating gender equality. Old-age security systems should be more transparent and adapt-
able to changing circumstances, so that citizens can continue to have confidence in them. And
finally the methodological basis for efficient monitoring of pension reforms and policies
should be improved.
Now, the member states had to present their first national strategy reports for old-age security.
61
 In
a first draft the Commission has analysed these reports already, whereas good practice and inno-
vative approaches of common interests are identified and presented to the member states.
62
 In
Spring 2003, the Council and the Commission have to provide a joint report to assess national
old-age security strategies and identify good practices. Furthermore, in 2004 they are going to
assess the objectives and working methods established and decide upon objectives, methods and
timetables for the future old-age security strategy.
It is mentioned below, that there is no accord on social indicators and benchmarks as instructed by
the Gothenburg Council in June 2001 yet. In the following part it will be outlined, that these indi-
cators are an important element of the OMC.
63
3.3 The point at issue: Social indicators and benchmarks
In addition to the formulation of common objectives and working methods, the development and
choice of appropriate quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks are in the foreground
of current national and European efforts. They are supposed to supply comparable information on
trends that are of importance for the ‘financial sustainability of pensions systems’, and to be able
to reflect the ‘adequacy of pensions’ as well as the ‘modernisation of pension systems’ – such as
pointed out in the joint report on Objectives and working methods in the area of pensions: apply-
ing the open method of co-ordination.
Social indicators, on the one hand, are a tool for assessing a country’s level of social development
and the impact of its social policy. Especially Eurostat and the European Commission support the
development of these indicators. Such indicators are already in use in several member states of the
EU. They started to play a crucial role in advancing the social dimension of Europe.
64
 Bench-
marks, on the other hand, may be defined as a standard or point of reference actual data has to be
compared to. Therefore, benchmarks are a tool for private and public organisations and for social
                                                  
61
 The German government e.g. has presented their report in June 2002. For this report see Deutscher Bunde-
stag (2002).
62
 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2002).
63
 Cf. Ruland (2002: 39) as well as Schmähl (2002: 106). For an earlier and fundamental comment on this
issue see Schmähl (1991).
64
 Publications such as The Social Situation in Europe, The Social Protection in Europe, The Social Portrait
of Europe or the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) have disseminated the social
monitoring of the EU. Cf. Göbel (2002: 128).
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security systems as well as to assess their performance. They should help to evaluate how an or-
ganisation or a system is doing relatively to its peers. A main problem in this context is that
benchmarks might ignore structural differences. Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind, that con-
cerning the OMC the choice of indicators, as well as the definition of benchmarks are the result of
political decisions and therefore not neutral. They strongly depend on the normative approaches
of the involved actors and on the objectives of the national old-age security systems.
65
In view of the beginning of the discussion, and in the absence of empirical data it is very difficult
to draw a specific scenario concerning the direct and indirect effects of the OMC for the old-age
security systems within EU member states, as well as in candidate countries. So far, the conse-
quences of the OMC, as well as the use of social indicators and benchmarks in this process are
unknown.
66
 However, following the discussions about social indicators and benchmarks, as well
in EU member states and candidate countries as by scientists and administration members, several
political and technical problems are pointed out, e.g. the question of what should be measured by
the indicator and benchmark as well? Should only those security systems be considered which are
defined as old-age security – the mandatory or the voluntary systems, and should private retire-
ment provision be included as well? That leads to the puzzle of what is old-age security? A further
question is in this context, what will actually be measured with an indicator?
67
In view of these issues two different approaches to monitor pension reforms were discussed on the
Community level. One was developed by a rather socially orientated actor, whereas the other was
created by a more economically orientated actor. The more economically orientated approach was
developed by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), who has presented in two reports a com-
prehensive projective analysis through 2050 on the impact of an ageing population on the public
old-age security systems.
68
 The economically orientated recommendations of the EPC are based
on this analysis. It consists of long-term simulations of public pension expenditure, which is based
on demographic and macro-economic assumptions. The central indicators proposed in the latest
report were on ‘old-age dependency ratio’
69
 and ‘budgetary projections of future expenditures on
pensions’. Table 1 shows the latest result of the projections on spending before taxes on public
                                                  
65
 For these aspects see Porte, et al. (2001) as well as Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -
gestaltung e.V. (2001); Devetzi / Schmitt (2002) and Semrau / Stubig (1999). The use of benchmarking as
an instrument to promote change and continuous improvement of Europe’s competitive performance was
developed in the mid-90’s by two Commission communications; for these communications see
Commission of the European Communities (1996) and Commission of the European Communities (1997).
It is interesting to note, that this work is obviously built upon a paper published by the European Round
Table of Industrialists (1996). This organisation is a forum of 42 European industrial leaders aiming at
promoting the competitiveness and growth of Europe's economy. For this link see Porte, et al. (2001: 293).
66
 Cf. Schulte (2002: 26). A theoretical scenario will be lined out in part 4.
67
 For extensive comments on this issue see Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (2002).
68
 Cf. Economic Policy Committee (2000) as well as Economic Policy Committee (2001).
69
 This indicator measures the population aged 65 and over as per cent of population aged 15 to 64. Cf.
Economic Policy Committee (2001: 10 ff.).
18
pensions as percentage of GDP.
70
 It shows that in 2000 spending on public pensions accounted for
an average of 10 per cent of GDP, albeit with considerable variation across the EU member
states.
71
Table 1: Public expenditures (including public replacement revenues) to people aged over 55
before taxes (as % of GDP) – current policy scenario
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
PEAK
CHANGE
Belgium 10,0 9,9 11,4 13,3 13,7 13,3 3,7
Denmark 10,5 12,5 13,8 14,5 14,0 13,3 4,1
Germany 11,8 11,2 12,6 15,5 16,6 16,9 5,0
Greece 12,6 12,6 15,4 19,6 23,8 24,8 12,2
Spain 9,4 8,9 9,9 12,6 16,0 17,3 7,6
France 12,1 13,1 15,0 16,0 15,8 ./. 4,0
Ireland 4,6 5,0 6,7 7,6 8,3 9,0 4,4
Italy 13,8 13,9 14,8 15,7 15,7 14,1 2,1
Luxembourg 7,4 7,5 8,2 9,2 9,5 9,3 2,2
Netherlands 7,9 9,1 11,1 13,1 14,1 13,6 6,2
Austria 14,5 14,9 16,0 18,1 18,3 17,0 4,2
Portugal 9,8 11,8 13,1 13,6 13,8 13,2 4,1
Finland 11,3 11,6 12,9 14,9 16,0 15,9 4,7
Sweden 9,0 9,6 10,7 11,4 11,4 10,7 2,6
United
Kingdom
5,5 5,1 4,9 5,2 5,0 4,4 -1,1
EU 10,4 10,4 11,5 13,0 13,6 13,3 3,2
Source: Economic Policy Committee (2001: 22).
The table shows a rise of public spending for old-age security between 3 and 5 per cent of GDP in
most member states over the next five decades, although the projected rise in spending on public
pensions is significant sporadically. The evolution of public pension expenditures can be consid-
ered by examining member states in groups: the UK is the only member state to actually project a
decrease in public pension spending as a share of GDP. Relatively low increases between 2 to 3
per cent of GDP are projected for Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden. The countries that face the
biggest challenges on pension expenditure are Spain and Greece, where increases in spending of 8
and 12 per cent of GDP are projected, respectively. The suggested policy recommendation is to
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 The projections cover old-age pensions, early retirement pensions, disability and survivors pensions as well
as other replacement income for persons aged over 55. Cf. Economic Policy Committee (2001: 21).
71
 The EPC pointed out, that these difference, in part, stem from the fact the public pensions in some coun-
tries include earning-related schemes with entitlements dependent upon past contributions: this tends to
lead to a higher level of public spending on pensions. In contrast, public pension schemes in other countries
operate on a more flat-rate basis, often aiming at providing a minimum level of retirement income: these
public pensions are supplemented with private occupational schemes and/or private savings which fall out-
side the public sector, and consequently the scope of this projection exercise. Some of the differences may
also arise from the variability in the coverage of the projections. Cf. Economic Policy Committee (2001:
22).
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curtail spending in this area, in order to maintain the sustainability of public finances.
72
 In this
context it has to be clarified that the report does not consider whether an indicator is able to meas-
ure the capacity of systems to meet their social objectives or, to meet changing societal needs –
even though these issues were identified as key stakes in old-age security reforms during the
Gothenburg and the Stockholm Council.
73
A rather socially orientated and comprehensive approach was outlined in the Commission’ discus-
sion-paper Social indicators for monitoring pension reforms.
74
 The purpose of this paper was to
set off an orientation debate on the most appropriate indicators in the area of pension reforms. In
this paper the Commission pointed out that indicators on pension reforms should allow for the
large diversity of national old-age security systems. At the same time they are supposed to be ca-
pable of providing comparable quantitative information on the major economic, financial and
demographic trends affecting the long-term sustainability of old-age security, as well as informa-
tion on the progress of pension reform and its likely impact. For this purpose a large variety of
indicators will be needed: performance indicators (drawn from statistical data) as well as political
indicators (mostly drawn from administrative or institutional information); retrospective indica-
tors as well as projections. The paper clarifies a possible identical thematic structure for a com-
prehensive social indicator approach, namely indicators for measuring financial sustainability,
social cohesion and adaptability to change. This structure is the basis for the set of possible indi-
cators presented in this paper. The document gives an overview about the ‘justification’, the ‘in-
terpretation’ and the ‘source’ of most of the indicators.
75
Concerning the social indicators to monitor old-age security reforms, one remark to these different
approaches of the actors has to be made. Obviously, it is very difficult to agree on a common ap-
proach due to different priorities of the actors. As clarified in the joint report on Objectives and
working methods in the area of pensions: applying the open method of co-ordination, differences
lead to a compromise that neither satisfies the economically orientated nor the socially orientated
actors. In view of the different approaches of these actors, an accord on social indicators and
benchmarks is not to be expected soon. First it has to be discussed how the old-age security sys-
tems can be compared, and how the social components of the systems can be presented suffi-
ciently. From a normative point of view it is very important that not those member states who
burden their national budgets least assessed top but those which, at the same time, maintain the
highest possible level of protection.
76
 For the society of EU member states as well as of candidate
countries, this nexus is extremely crucial.
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 Cf. Economic Policy Committee (2001: 23 ff.)
73
 Though, the EPC points out that it will take the initiative to work out indicators that would not only tell
about the sustainability of public finances, but also the quality of the old-age security systems. Cf.
Economic Policy Committee (2001: 32).
74
 The paper was issued by the DG Employment and Social Affairs’ (DG ESA) of the European Commission.
75
 Cf. European Commission (2001) as well as the comments in Göbel (2002: 141 ff.) and Schulte
(2002: 21 ff.).
76
 For this criticism see Schmähl (2002: 117 ff.) and Sommer (2002: 4 f.) as well.
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4. The OMC concerning the enlargement process
In view of the numerous problems that social security systems are facing, e.g. the low rate of em-
ployment or the demographic change in current member states and also in candidate countries,
one main issue for the latter is their active participation in the OMC already before joining the
EU. So far, candidate countries are not involved in this process at all. They do not have an official
observer status, even though the Council and the Commission call for involvement of all relevant
stakeholders in the OMC process. These stakeholders are the EU and the member states, as well
as the social partners and civil society.
77
 The OMC is meant to improve transparency and deepen
democratic participation – key objectives of the EU, as indicated in the White Paper on European
Governance.
78
 Indeed, the Commission points out that co-operation on social protection will also
be developed. In accordance with the conclusions of the Gothenburg Council, the Commission
will start covering candidate countries' initiatives as from its 2003 Annual Synthesis Report.
79
However, in the area of old-age security this kind of EU activity seems to be new, so that not
much thought has been given to the question of how exactly the candidate countries can be inte-
grated into these tasks. In view of that, no progress can be observed in this area so far. Neverthe-
less, concerning the enlargement there are some issues to be discussed.
The first issue to be raised is, whether the common objectives, working methods, the discussed
social indicators and benchmarks are finally fixed by now, or whether they will be restated as a
consequence of the enlargement. Moreover, what are the expectations of candidate countries on
the OMC? How do they understand the OMC as a whole, and how do they assess the broad com-
mon objectives, working methods and indicators? How can candidate countries prove the
sustainability and adequacy of their old-age security systems to the Community? These unan-
swered questions show that candidate countries are not involved in the current debates – they are
even left without detailed information on the process. All these points lead to the question of
whether candidate countries should be invited soon to participate actively in the OMC.
A further question is, whether the OMC will be an appropriate instrument to prepare candidate
countries for joining the European Union. Close co-operation between EU member states and
candidate countries in the area of old-age security will allow to share experiences, learn from each
other, and encourage each other to develop sustainable old-age security systems for the future.
Early involvement of candidate countries into the ongoing OMC process of old-age security re-
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As an example see Commission of the European Communities (2000: 8); Commission of the European
Communities (2001: 12); European Council (2000: 8) and several further official documents of the EU.
78
Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2001: 10 ff.). Indeed, to prepare the candidate countries for
joining the EES, the Commission has developed close co-operation with them, as indicated by the Joint As-
sessment Papers (JAPs), which are a diagnosis of the labour market situation and trends and a proposal for
policy reform. They define the policy framework for preparing future European Social Fund (ESF) inter-
vention. Furthermore JAPs contribute to identifying policy priorities for the pre-accession strategy and
PHARE support. Building on the experience of the Employment JAPs, the Commission has invited candi-
date countries to embark in co-operation on social inclusion/poverty in 2002, with a view to involve them
in EU efforts based on the OMC.
79
 Cf. European Commission (2001: 42 f.).
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forms should help them to prepare efficiently for accession and to design reforms in line with the
principles set out by the European Council. Furthermore, EU member states could take advantage
of the experience with recent reforms of candidate countries.
80
Concerning this issue one remaining questions is whether the OMC will entail any significant
changes in the old-age security systems of the EU member states and of the candidate countries.
Within the current framework, old-age security systems compete with each other directly and
publicly.
81
 The crucial question is: Will the OMC have any (direct or indirect) effects, will it
strengthen the process of convergence of old-age security systems within the EU or will it lead to
a common system effective in all member states within an enlarged Union? And if so, what kind
of reform measures will be implemented?
In theory, one could think of the following scenario: the OMC will be implemented as described
and result in a development towards the convergence of systems. The rating of the old-age secu-
rity systems with the help of the indicators and benchmarks – and possibly a ranking – would lead
to peer-pressure in the direction of best-practice. In that case, those member states with old-age
security systems that do not match the common conception of old-age security could feel obliged
by the Community respectively the other member states and for economic and/or fiscal reasons to
modify their old-age security systems by national regulations. These regulations could alter the
benefits of the former old-age security system and its financing, the age limit or the insured per-
sons. In this case the OMC would lead to a (strongly) converging European model of old-age se-
curity. With a view to the EU enlargement this scenario is of relevance. The old-age security sys-
tems of the candidate countries are marked by different analogies with regard to their conception:
obligatory poverty avoiding security by pay-as-you-go measures as a first pillar and supplemen-
tary obligatory capital funded schemes as second and third pillars for the maintenance of the stan-
dard of living reached in the course of gainful activity. Within the framework of the OMC these
structural elements could establish themselves as benchmarks and best-practice: on the one hand
these elements are widely in line with the recommendations of the authoritative (i.e. the eco-
nomic-orientated) actors of the OMC. On the other hand and as indicated, the choice of indicators
as well as the definition of benchmarks are the result of political decisions. Thus, they strongly
depend on the normative approaches of the involved actors and on the objectives of the national
old-age security systems. This constellation could force a clear-cut vision towards an economic-
orientated model of old-age security within an enlarged EU. In this case, the peer-pressure re-
sulting from the OMC would effect particularly current EU member states. The majority of their
old-age security systems do not coincide with the old-age security model of the candidate coun-
tries or of the economic-orientated actors. A converging old-age security system could – accord-
ing to the previous considerations – show analogies to the already existing old-age security sys-
tems of the candidate countries.
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 For recent old-age security reforms, e.g. in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, see Deutsche Bank
Research (2002: 20 ff.).
81
 Cf. Terwey (2002: 436).
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5. Concluding remarks
As pointed out in the historical review, harmonisation of social security has been an obvious goal
in the past. During the European integration this goal has changed to convergence. Now, the OMC
represents a new form of regulation on the European level. It is softer than the classical legislative
approach, e.g. due to regulations and directives, but it is more than a simple non-binding recom-
mendation or political declaration. The key ingredient of the OMC approach is the use of a de-
centralised method of co-ordination in which various groupings of different interests play an ac-
tive role. In the area of old-age security The different actors can be classified into economically
and socially orientated actors. But tensions between them regarding the direction of old-age secu-
rity reforms still hinder the creation of a clear-cut European vision in this area: one group is more
interested in the long-term financial sustainability of old-age security systems and its possible
impact on public finances. In contrast to that, the other group focuses on maintaining people’s
trust in their national old-age security systems by ensuring that they meet their social functions of
providing safe and adequate old-age security. In addition to these approaches, the European
Commission combines the objective of social and economic visions. The result is a mix of these
two, although the economic vision dominates at the moment. Nevertheless, an essential element of
the OMC is the need to agree on a range of quantitative and qualitative indicators. These are
meant to assess the current system of each member state and its progress with the common strat-
egy and to exchange good practice among member states after peer-review. But, concepts that are
satisfying all stakeholders are not developed yet, so that the debate on indicators and benchmarks
is still an ongoing process. The last point inspected in this paper concerns the enlargement proc-
ess. As pointed out, the candidate countries are not involved in the OMC process at all. So far,
they do not even have an observer-status and consequently no influence on this process. There-
fore, the EU might invite candidate countries for an active participation in the OMC to voice their
opinions and to define their positions in this area even before joining the EU.
However, the direct as well as indirect effects of the OMC are yet unknown. It is still an open
question whether the OMC will have any consequences at all, and if so, what will they be: Will
the OMC reinforce the process of convergence or even of harmonisation; and what kind of con-
crete reforms will follow in the area of old-age security due to the OMC? Furthermore, it can not
be foreseen yet whether the OMC process or the implemented reforms regarding old-age security
have further implications on labour markets, capital markets or markets for goods and services.
Finally, it is still unknown, whether there will be any effects on the level and distribution of in-
come, on saving, investment and consumption or other macroeconomic indicators. These impor-
tant issues and crucial connections between different policy areas are not part of the current dis-
cussions and analyses yet. However, as you can see, the actors are struggling to define a common
European line in old-age security policy. In sum, questions of competence and power of the actors
as well as questions of the best old-age security concept are dominating their activities.
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